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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved un-
precedented success in numerous machine learn-
ing tasks in various domains. However, the exis-
tence of adversarial examples has raised concerns
about applying deep learning to safety-critical ap-
plications. As a result, we have witnessed increas-
ing interests in studying attack and defense mech-
anisms for DNN models on different data types,
such as images, graphs and text. Thus, it is neces-
sary to provide a systematic and comprehensive
overview of the main threats of attacks and the
success of corresponding countermeasures. In this
survey, we review the state of the art algorithms
for generating adversarial examples and the coun-
termeasures against adversarial examples, for the
three popular data types, i.e., images, graphs and
text.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have become increasingly popular
and successful in many machine learning tasks. They have
been deployed in different recognition problems in the do-
mains of images, graphs, text and speech, with remark-
able success. In the image recognition domain, they are
able to recognize objects with near-human level accuracy
(Krizhevsky et al., 2012; He et al., 2016). They are also
used in speech recognition (Hinton et al., 2012), natural lan-
guage processing (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) and
for playing games (Silver et al., 2016a).
Because of these accomplishments, deep learning tech-
niques are also applied in safety-critical tasks. For example,
in autonomous vehicles, deep convolutional neural networks
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(CNNs) are used to recognize road signs (Cires¸An et al.,
2012). The machine learning technique used here is re-
quired to be highly accurate, stable and reliable. But, what
if the CNN model fails to recognize the “STOP” sign by the
roadside and the vehicle keeps going? It will be a dangerous
situation. Similarly, in financial fraud detection systems,
companies frequently use graph convolutional networks
(GCNs) (Kipf & Welling, 2016) to decide whether their
customers are trustworthy or not. If there are fraudsters
disguising their personal identity information to evade the
company’s detection, it will cause a huge loss to the com-
pany. Therefore, the safety issues of deep neural networks
have become a major concern.
In recent years, many works (Szegedy et al., 2013; Good-
fellow et al., 2014b; He et al., 2016) have shown that DNN
models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can
be formally defined as – “Adversarial examples are inputs
to machine learning models that an attacker intentionally
designed to cause the model to make mistakes.” In the image
classification domain, these adversarial examples are inten-
tionally synthesized images which look almost exactly the
same as the original images (see figure 2), but can mislead
the classifier to provide wrong prediction outputs. For a
well-trained DNN image classifier on the MNIST dataset,
almost all the digit samples can be attacked by an impercep-
tible perturbation, added on the original image. Meanwhile,
in other application domains involving graphs, text or audio,
similar adversarial attacking schemes also exist to confuse
deep learning models. For example, perturbing only a cou-
ple of edges can mislead graph neural networks (Zu¨gner
et al., 2018), and inserting typos to a sentence can fool text
classification or dialogue systems (Ebrahimi et al., 2017).
As a result, the existence of adversarial examples in all ap-
plication fields has cautioned researchers against directly
adopting DNNs in safety-critical machine learning tasks.
To deal with the threat of adversarial examples, studies
have been published with the aim of finding countermea-
sures to protect deep neural networks. These approaches
can be roughly categorized to three main types: (a) Gradi-
ent Masking (Papernot et al., 2016b; Athalye et al., 2018):
since most attacking algorithms are based on the gradient
information of the classifiers, masking or obfuscating the
gradients will confuse the attack mechanisms. (b) Robust
Optimization (Madry et al., 2017; Kurakin et al., 2016b):
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these studies show how to train a robust classifier that can
correctly classify the adversarial examples. (c) Adversary
Detection (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Xu et al., 2017): the
approaches attempt to check whether a sample is benign or
adversarial before feeding it to the deep learning models.
It can be seen as a method of guarding against adversarial
examples. These methods improve DNN’s resistance to
adversarial examples.
In addition to building safe and reliable DNN models, study-
ing adversarial examples and their countermeasures is also
beneficial for us to understand the nature of DNNs and con-
sequently improve them. For example, adversarial perturba-
tions are perceptually indistinguishable to human eyes but
can evade DNN’s detection. This suggests that the DNN’s
predictive approach does not align with human reasoning.
There are works (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Ilyas et al., 2019)
to explain and interpret the existence of adversarial exam-
ples of DNNs, which can help us gain more insight into
DNN models.
In this review, we aim to summarize and discuss the main
studies dealing with adversarial examples and their counter-
measures. We provide a systematic and comprehensive re-
view on the start-of-the-art algorithms from images, graphs
and text domain, which gives an overview of the main tech-
niques and contributions to adversarial attacks and defenses.
The main structure of this survey is as follows:
In Section 2, we introduce some important definitions and
concepts which are frequently used in adversarial attacks
and their defenses. It also gives a basic taxonomy of the
types of attacks and defenses. In Section 3 and Section
4, we discuss main attack and defense techniques in the
image classification scenario. We use Section 5 to briefly
introduce some studies which try to explain the phenomenon
of adversarial examples. Section 6 and Section 7 review the
studies in graph and text data, respectively.
2. Definitions and Notations
In this section, we give a brief introduction to the key com-
ponents of model attacks and defenses. We hope that our
explanations can help our audience to understand the main
components of the related works on adversarial attacks and
their countermeasures. By answering the following ques-
tions, we define the main terminology:
• Adversary’s Goal (2.1.1)
What is the goal or purpose of the attacker? Does
he want to misguide the classifier’s decision on one
sample, or influence the overall performance of the
classifier?
• Adversary’s Knowledge (2.1.2)
What information is available to the attacker? Does
he know the classifier’s structure, its parameters or the
training set used for classifier training?
• Victim Models (2.1.3)
What kind of deep learning models do adversaries usu-
ally attack? Why are adversaries interested in attacking
these models?
• Security Evaluation (2.2)
How can we evaluate the safety of a victim model when
faced with adversarial examples? What is the relation-
ship and difference between these security metrics and
other model goodness metrics, such as accuracy or
risks?
2.1. Threat Model
2.1.1. ADVERSARY’S GOAL
• Poisoning Attack vs Evasion Attack
Poisoning attacks refer to the attacking algorithms that
allow an attacker to insert/modify several fake samples
into the training database of a DNN algorithm. These
fake samples can cause failures of the trained classi-
fier. They can result in the poor accuracy (Biggio et al.,
2012), or wrong prediction on some given test samples
(Zu¨gner et al., 2018). This type of attacks frequently
appears in the situation where the adversary has ac-
cess to the training database. For example, web-based
repositories and “honeypots” often collect malware ex-
amples for training, which provides an opportunity for
adversaries to poison the data.
In evasion attacks, the classifiers are fixed and usually
have good performance on benign testing samples. The
adversaries do not have authority to change the classi-
fier or its parameters, but they craft some fake samples
that the classifier cannot recognize. In other words,
the adversaries generate some fraudulent examples to
evade detection by the classifier. For example, in au-
tonomous driving vehicles, sticking a few pieces of
tapes on the stop signs can confuse the vehicle’s road
sign recognizer (Eykholt et al., 2017).
• Targeted Attack vs Non-Targeted Attack
In targeted attack, when the victim sample (x, y) is
given, where x is feature vector and y ∈ Y is the
ground truth label of x, the adversary aims to induce
the classifier to give a specific label t ∈ Y to the per-
turbed sample x′. For example, a fraudster is likely to
attack a financial company’s credit evaluation model
to disguise himself as a highly credible client of this
company.
If there is no specified target label t for the victim
sample x, the attack is called non-targeted attack. The
adversary only wants the classifier to predict incor-
rectly.
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2.1.2. ADVERSARY’S KNOWLEDGE
• White-Box Attack
In a white-box setting, the adversary has access to all
the information of the target neural network, including
its architecture, parameters, gradients, etc. The adver-
sary can make full use of the network information to
carefully craft adversarial examples. White-box attacks
have been extensively studied because the disclosure
of model architecture and parameters helps people un-
derstand the weakness of DNN models clearly and it
can be analyzed mathematically. As stated by (Trame`r
et al., 2017), security against white-box attacks is the
property that we desire ML models to have.
• Black-Box Attack
In a black-box attack setting, the inner configuration of
DNN models is unavailable to adversaries. Adversaries
can only feed the input data and query the outputs of
the models. They usually attack the models by keeping
feeding samples to the box and observing the output
to exploit the model’s input-output relationship, and
identity its weakness. Compared to white-box attacks,
black-box attacks are more practical in applications
because model designers usually do not open source
their model parameters for proprietary reasons.
• Semi-white (Gray) Box Attack
In a semi-white box or gray box attack setting, the
attacker trains a generative model for producing ad-
versarial examples in a white-box setting. Once the
generative model is trained, the attacker does not need
victim model anymore, and can craft adversarial exam-
ples in a black-box setting.
2.1.3. VICTIM MODELS
We briefly summarize the machine learning models which
are susceptible to adversarial examples, and some popular
deep learning architectures used in image, graph and text
data domains. In our review, we mainly discuss studies of
adversarial examples for deep neural networks.
A Conventional Machine Learning Models
For conventional machine learning tools, there is a
long history of studying safety issues. Biggio et al.
(2013) attack SVM classifiers and fully-connected shal-
low neural networks for the MNIST dataset. Barreno
et al. (2010) examine the security of SpamBayes, a
Bayesian method based spam detection software. In
(Dalvi et al., 2004), the security of Naive Bayes clas-
sifiers is checked. Many of these ideas and strategies
have been adopted in the study of adversarial attacks
in deep neural networks.
B Deep Neural Networks
Different from traditional machine learning techniques
which require domain knowledge and manual feature
engineering, DNNs are end-to-end learning algorithms.
The models use raw data directly as input to the model,
and learn objects’ underlying structures and attributes.
The end-to-end architecture of DNNs makes it easy
for adversaries to exploit their weakness, and generate
high-quality deceptive inputs (adversarial examples).
Moreover, because of the implicit nature of DNNs,
some of their properties are still not well understood or
interpretable. Therefore, studying the security issues of
DNN models is necessary. Next, we’ll briefly introduce
some popular victim deep learning models which are
used as “benchmark” models in attack/defense studies.
(a) Fully-Connected Neural Networks
Fully-connected neural networks (FC) are com-
posed of layers of artificial neurons. In each layer,
the neurons take the input from previous layers,
process it with the activation function and send it
to the next layer; the input of first layer is sample
x, and the (softmax) output of last layer is the
score F (x). An m-layer fully connected neural
network can be formed as:
z(0) = x; z(l+1) = σ(W lzl + bl).
One thing to note is that, the back-propagation
algorithm helps calculate ∂F (x;θ)∂θ , which makes
gradient descent effective in learning parameters.
In adversarial learning, back-propagation also fa-
cilitates the calculation of the term: ∂F (x;θ)∂x , rep-
resenting the output’s response to a change in
input. This term is widely used in the studies to
craft adversarial examples.
(b) Convolutional Neural Networks
In computer vision tasks, Convolutional Neural
Networks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) is one of the
most widely used models. CNN models aggregate
the local features from the image to learn the rep-
resentations of image objects. CNN models can
be viewed as a sparse-version of fully connected
neural networks: most of the weights between
layers are zero. Its training algorithm or gradi-
ents calculation can also be inherited from fully
connected neural networks.
(c) Graph Convolutional Networks
The work of (Kipf & Welling, 2016) introduces
the graph convolutional networks, which later
became a popular node classification model for
graph data. The idea of graph convolutional net-
works is similar to CNN: it aggregates the infor-
mation from neighbor nodes to learn represen-
tations for each node v, and outputs the score
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F (v,X) for prediction:
H(0) = X; H(l+1) = σ(AˆH(l)W l).
where X denotes the input graph’s feature ma-
trix, and Aˆ depends on graph degree matrix and
adjacency matrix.
(d) Recurrent Neural Networks
Recurrent Neural Networks are very useful for
tackling sequential data. As a result, they are
widely used in natural language processing. The
RNN models, especially LSTM(Hochreiter &
Schmidhuber, 1997), are able to store the pre-
vious time information in memory, and exploit
useful information from previous sequence for
next-step prediction.
2.2. Security Evaluation
We also need to evaluate the model’s resistance to adversar-
ial examples. “Robustness” and “Adversarial Risk” are two
terms used to describe this resistance of DNN models to one
single sample, and the total population, respectively.
2.2.1. ROBUSTNESS
Definition 1. (minimal perturbation): Given the classifier
F and data (x, y), the adversarial perturbation has the least
norm (the most unnoticeable perturbation):
δmin = argmin
δ
||δ|| subject to F (x+ δ) 6= y.
Here, || · || usually refers to lp norm.
Definition 2. (robustness): The norm of minimal perturba-
tion:
r(x, F ) = ||δmin||.
Definition 3. (global robustness): The expectation of ro-
bustness over the whole population D:
ρ(F ) = E
x∼D
r(x, F ).
The minimal perturbation can find the adversarial example
which is most similar to x under the model F . Therefore, the
larger r(x, F ) or ρ(F ) is, the adversary needs to sacrifice
more similarity to generate adversarial samples, implying
that the classifier F is more robust or safe.
2.2.2. ADVERSARIAL RISK (LOSS)
Definition 4. (Most-Adversarial Example) Given the clas-
sifier F and data x, the sample xadv with the largest loss
value in x’s -neighbor ball:
xadv = argmax
x′
L(x′, F ) subject to ||x′ − x|| ≤ .
Definition 5. (Adversarial Loss): The loss value for the
most-adversarial example:
Ladv(x) = L(xadv) = max||x′−x||< L(θ, x
′, y)
Definition 6. (global adversarial loss): The expectation of
the loss value on xadv over the data distribution D:
Radv(F ) = E
x∼D
max
||x′−x||<
L(θ, x′, y) (1)
The most-adversarial example is the point where the model
is most likely to be fooled in the neighborhood of x. A
lower loss value Ladv indicates a more robust model F .
2.2.3. ADVERSARIAL RISK VS RISK
The definition of Adversarial Risk is drawn from the defini-
tion of classifier risk (empirical risk):
R(F ) = E
x∼D
L(θ, x, y)
Risk studies a classifier’s performance on samples from nat-
ural distributionD. Whereas, adversarial risk from Equation
(1) studies a classifier’s performance on adversarial example
x′. It is important to note that x′ may not necessarily follow
the distributionD. Thus, the studies on adversarial examples
are different from these on model generalization. Moreover,
a number of studies reported the relation between these two
properties (Tsipras et al., 2018; Su et al., 2018; Stutz et al.,
2019; Zhang et al., 2019b). From our clarification, we hope
that our audience get the difference and relation between
risk and adversarial risk, and the importance of studying
adversarial countermeasures.
2.3. Notations
With the aforementioned definitions, Table 1 lists the nota-
tions which will be used in the subsequent sections.
3. Generating Adversarial Examples
In this section, we introduce main methods for generating
adversarial examples in the image classification domain.
Studying adversarial examples in the image domain is con-
sidered to be essential because: (a) perceptual similarity be-
tween fake and benign images is intuitive to observers, and
(b) image data and image classifiers have simpler structure
than other domains, like graph or audio. Thus, many stud-
ies concentrate on attacking image classifiers as a standard
case. In this section, we assume that the image classifiers
refer to fully connected neural networks and Convolutional
Neural Networks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). The most com-
mon datasets used in these studies include (1) handwritten
letter images dataset MNIST, (2) CIFAR10 object dataset
and (3) ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009). Next, we go through
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Notations Description
x Victim data sample
x′ Perturbed data sample
δ Perturbation
B(x) lp-distance neighbor ball around x with ra-
dius 
D Natural data distribution
|| · ||p lp norm
y Sample x’s ground truth label
t Target label t
Y Set of possible labels. Usually we assume
there are m labels
C Classifier whose output is a label: C(x) =
y
F DNN model which outputs a score vector:
F (x) ∈ [0, 1]m
Z Logits: last layer outputs before softmax:
F (x) = softmax(Z(x))
σ Activation function used in neural networks
θ Parameters of the model F
L Loss function for training. We simplify
L(F (x), y) in the form L(θ, x, y).
Table 1. Notations.
some main methods used to generate adversarial image ex-
amples for evasion attack (white-box, black-box, grey-box,
physical-world attack), and poisoning attack settings. Note
that we also summarize all the attack methods in Table A in
the Appendix A.
3.1. White-box Attacks
Generally, in a white-box attack setting, when the classi-
fier C (model F ) and the victim sample (x, y) are given
to the attacker, his goal is to synthesize a fake image x′
perceptually similar to original image x but it can mislead
the classifier C to give wrong prediction results. It can be
formulated as:
find x′ satisfying ||x′ − x|| ≤ 
such that C(x′) = t 6= y
where || · || measures the dissimilarity between x′ and x,
which is usually lp norm. Next, we will go through main
methods to realize this formulation.
3.1.1. BIGGIO’S ATTACK
In (Biggio et al., 2013), adversarial examples are generated
on the MNIST dataset targeting conventional machine learn-
ing classifiers like SVMs and 3-layer fully-connected neural
networks.
It optimizes the discriminant function to mislead the classi-
fier. For example, on the MNIST dataset, for a linear SVM
Figure 1. Biggio’s attack on SVM classifier for letter recognition.
(Image Credit: (Biggio et al., 2013))
classifier, its discriminant function g(x) = 〈w, x〉+ b, will
mark a sample x with positive value g(x) > 0 to be in class
“3”, and x with g(x) ≤ 0 to be in class “not 3”. An example
of this attack is shown in figure 1.
Suppose we have a sample x which is correctly classified to
be “3”. For this model, Biggio’s attack crafts a new example
x′ to minimize the discriminant value g(x′) while keeping
||x′−x||1 small. If g(x′) is negative, the sample is classified
as “not 3”, but x′ is still close to x, so the classifier is fooled.
The studies about adversarial examples for conventional
machine learning models (Dalvi et al., 2004; Biggio et al.,
2012; 2013) have inspired investigations on safety issues of
deep learning models.
3.1.2. SZEGEDY’S L-BFGS ATTACK
The work of (Szegedy et al., 2013) is the first to attack
deep neural network image classifiers. They formulate their
optimization problem as a search for minimal distorted ad-
versarial example x′, with the objective:
minimize ||x− x′||22
subject to C(x′) = t and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m (2)
The problem is approximately solved by introducing the
loss function, which results in the following objective:
minimize c||x− x′||22 + L(θ, x′, t)
subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m
In the optimization objective of this problem, the first term
imposes the similarity between x′ and x. The second term
encourages the algorithm to find x′ which has a small loss
value to label t, so the classifier C is very likely to predict x′
as t. By continuously changing the value of constant c, they
can find an x′ which has minimum distance to x, and at the
same time fool the classifier C. To solve this problem, they
implement the L-BFGS (Liu & Nocedal, 1989) algorithm.
3.1.3. FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD
In (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), an one-step method is intro-
duced to fast generate adversarial examples. The formula-
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Figure 2. By adding an unnoticeable perturbation, “panda” is clas-
sified as “gibbon”. (Image Credit: (Goodfellow et al., 2014b))
tion is:
x′ = x+ sign(∇xL(θ, x, y)) non-target
x′ = x− sign(∇xL(θ, x, t)) target on t
For a targeted attack setting, this formulation can be seen as
a one-step of gradient descent to solve the problem:
minimize L(θ, x′, t)
subject to ||x′ − x||∞ ≤  and x′ ∈ [0, 1]m
(3)
The objective function in (3) searches the point which has
the minimum loss value to label t in x’s -neighbor ball,
which is the location where model F is most likely to predict
it to the target class t. In this way, the one-step generated
sample x′ is also likely to fool the model. An example of
FGSM-generated samples on ImageNet is shown in Figure
2.
Compared to the iterative attack in Section 3.1.2, FGSM is
fast in generating adversarial examples, because it only in-
volves calculating one back-propagation step. Thus, FGSM
addresses the demands of tasks that need to generate a large
amount of adversarial examples. For example, adversarial
training (Kurakin et al., 2016a), uses FGSM to produce
adversarial samples for all instances in the training set.
3.1.4. DEEP FOOL
In (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), the authors study a clas-
sifier F ’s decision boundary around data point x. They try
to find a path such that x can go beyond the decision bound-
ary, as shown in figure 3, so that the classifier will give a
different prediction for x. For example, to attack x0 (true
label is digit 4) to digit class 3, the decision boundary is
described as F3 = {z : F (x)4 − F (x)3 = 0}. We denote
f(x) = F (x)4 − F (x)3 for short. In each attacking step, it
linearizes the decision boundary hyperplane using Taylor ex-
pansionF ′3 = {x : f(x) ≈ f(x0)+〈∇xf(x0)·(x−x0)〉 =
0}, and calculates the orthogonal vector ω from x0 to plane
F ′3. This vector ω can be the perturbation that makes x0
go beyond the decision boundary F3. By moving along
the vector ω, the algorithm is able to find the adversarial
example x′0 that is classified to class 3.
(𝑥#′, 3)
(𝑥#, 4)
Figure 3. Decision Boundaries: the hyperplane F1 (F2 or F3)
separates the data points belonging to class 4 and class 1 (class
2 or 3). The sample x0 crosses the decision boundary F3, so the
perturbed data x′0 is classified as class 3. (Image Credit: (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016))
The experiments of DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016) show that for common DNN image classifiers, almost
all test samples are very close to their decision boundary.
For a well-trained LeNet classifier on MNIST dataset, over
90% of test samples can be attacked by small perturbations
whose l∞ norm is below 0.1 where the total range is [0, 1].
This suggests that the DNN classifiers are not robust to small
perturbations.
3.1.5. JACOBIAN-BASED SALIENCY MAP ATTACK
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot
et al., 2016a) introduced a method based on calculating the
Jacobian matrix of the score function F . It can be viewed
as a greedy attack algorithm by iteratively manipulating the
pixel which is the most influential to the model output.
The authors used the Jacobian matrix JF (x) =
∂F (x)
∂x =
{∂Fj(x)∂xi }i×j to model F (x)’s change in response to the
change of its input x. For a targeted attack setting where
the adversary aims to craft an x′ that is classified to the
target class t, they repeatedly search and manipulate pixel
xi whose increase (decrease) will cause Ft(x) to increase
or decrease
∑
j 6=t Fj(x). As a result, for x, the model will
give it the largest score to label t.
3.1.6. BASIC ITERATIVE METHOD (BIM) / PROJECTED
GRADIENT DESCENT (PGD) ATTACK
The Basic Iterative Method was first introduced by (Kurakin
et al., 2016a) and (Kurakin et al., 2016b). It is an iterative
version of the one-step attack FGSM in Section 3.1.3. In a
non-targeted setting, it gives an iterative formulation to craft
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x′:
x0 = x
xt+1 = Clipx,(x
t + αsign(∇xL(θ, xt, y)))
Here, Clip denotes the function to project its argument to
the surface of x’s -neighbor ball B(x) : {x′ : ||x′ −
x||∞ ≤ }. The step size α is usually set to be relatively
small (e.g. 1 unit of pixel change for each pixel), and step
numbers guarantee that the perturbation can reach the border
(e.g. step = /α + 10). This iterative attacking method
is also known as Projected Gradient Method (PGD) if the
algorithm is added by a random initialization on x, used in
work (Madry et al., 2017).
This BIM (or PGD) attack heuristically searches the sam-
ples x′ which have the largest loss value in the l∞ ball
around the original sample x. These adversarial examples
are called “most-adversarial” examples: they are the sample
points which are most aggressive and most-likely to fool
the classifiers, when the perturbation intensity (its lp norm)
is limited. Finding these adversarial examples is helpful to
find the weaknesses of deep learning models.
3.1.7. CARLINI & WAGNER’S ATTACK
Carlini and Wagner’s attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b)
counterattacks the defense strategy (Papernot et al., 2016b)
which were shown to be successful against FGSM and L-
BFGS attacks. C&W’s attack aims to solve the same prob-
lem as defined in L-BFGS attack (section 3.1.2), namely
trying to find the minimally-distorted perturbation (Equation
2).
The authors address the problem (2) by instead solving:
minimize ||x− x′||22 + c · f(x′, t)
subject to x′ ∈ [0, 1]m
where f is defined as f(x′, t) = (maxi 6=t Z(x′)i −
Z(x′)t)+. Minimizing f(x′, t) encourages the algorithm
to find an x′ that has larger score for class t than any other
label, so that the classifier will predict x′ as class t. Next,
by applying a line search on constant c, we can find the x′
that has the least distance to x.
The function f(x, y) can also be viewed as a loss function
for data (x, y): it penalizes the situation where there are
some labels i with scores Z(x)i larger than Z(x)y. It can
also be called margin loss function.
The only difference between this formulation and the one
in L-BFGS attack (section 3.1.2) is that C&W’s attack uses
margin loss f(x, t) instead of cross entropy loss L(x, t).
The benefit of using margin loss is that when C(x′) = t,
the margin loss value f(x′, t) = 0, the algorithm will di-
rectly minimize the distance from x′ to x. This procedure is
more efficient for finding the minimally distorted adversarial
example.
The authors claim their attack is one of the strongest attacks,
breaking many defense strategies which were shown to be
successful. Thus, their attacking method can be used as a
benchmark to examine the safety of DNN classifiers or the
quality of other adversarial examples.
3.1.8. GROUND TRUTH ATTACK
Attacks and defenses keep improving to defeat each other.
In order to end this stalemate, the work of (Carlini et al.,
2017) tries to find the “provable strongest attack”. It can be
seen as a method to find the theoretical minimally-distorted
adversarial examples.
This attack is based on Reluplex (Katz et al., 2017), an al-
gorithm for verifying the properties of neural networks. It
encodes the model parameters F and data (x, y) as the sub-
jects of a linear-like programming system, and then solves
the system to check whether there exists an eligible sample
x′ in x’s neighbor B(x) that can fool the model. If we
keep reducing the radius  of search region B(x) until the
system determines that there does not exist such an x′ that
can fool the model, the last found adversarial example is
called the ground truth adversarial example, because it has
been proved to have least dissimilarity with x.
The ground-truth attack is the first work to seriously calcu-
late the exact robustness (minimal perturbation) of classi-
fiers. However, this method involves using a SMT solver (a
complex algorithm to check the satisfiability of a series of
theories), which will make it slow and not scalable to large
networks. More recent works (Tjeng et al., 2017; Xiao et al.,
2018c) have improved the efficiency of the ground-truth
attack.
3.1.9. OTHER lp ATTACKS
Previous studies are mostly focused on l2 or l∞ norm-
constrained perturbations. However, there are other papers
which consider other types of lp attacks.
(a) One-pixel Attack. In (Su et al., 2019), it studies a similar
problem as in Section 3.1.2, but constrains the perturbation’s
l0 norm. Constraining l0 norm of the perturbation x′−xwill
limit the number of pixels that are allowed to be changed.
It shows that: on CIFAR10 dataset, for a well-trained CNN
classifier (e.g. VGG16, which has 85.5% accuracy on test
data), most of the testing samples (63.5%) can be attacked
by changing the value of only one pixel in a non-targeted
setting. This also demonstrates the poor robustness of deep
learning models.
(b) EAD: Elastic-Net Attack. In (Chen et al., 2018), it also
studies a similar problem as in Section 3.1.2, but constrains
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the perturbations l1 and l2 norm together. As shown in their
experimental work (Sharma & Chen, 2017), some strong
defense models that aim to reject l∞ and l2 norm attacks
(Madry et al., 2017) are still vulnerable to the l1-based
Elastic-Net attack.
3.1.10. UNIVERSAL ATTACK
Previous methods only consider one specific targeted victim
sample x. However, the work (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2017a) devises an algorithm that successfully misleads a
classifier’s decision on almost all testing images. They try
to find a perturbation δ satisfying:
1. ||δ||p ≤ 
2. P
x∼D(x)
(C(x+ δ) 6= C(x)) ≤ 1− σ
This formulation aims to find a perturbation δ such that the
classifier gives wrong decisions on most of the samples.
In their experiments, for example, they successfully find a
perturbation that can attack 85.4% of the test samples in the
ILSVRC 2012 (Russakovsky et al., 2015) dataset under a
ResNet-152 (He et al., 2016) classifier.
The existence of “universal” adversarial examples reveals
a DNN classifier’s inherent weakness on all of the input
samples. As claimed in (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a), it
may suggest the property of geometric correlation among
the high-dimensional decision boundary of classifiers.
3.1.11. SPATIALLY TRANSFORMED ATTACK
Traditional adversarial attack algorithms directly modify the
pixel value of an image, which changes the image’s color
intensity. The work (Xiao et al., 2018b) devises another
method, called a Spatially Transformed Attack. They per-
turb the image by doing slight spatial transformation: they
translate, rotate and distort the local image features slightly.
The perturbation is small enough to evade human inspection
but it can fool the classifiers. One example is in figure (4).
Classified as ‘5’ Classified as ‘3’
Figure 4. The top part of digit “5”’ is perturbed to be “thicker”. For
the image which was correctly classified as “5”, after distortion is
now classified as “3”.
3.1.12. UNRESTRICTED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Previous attack methods only consider adding unnoticeable
perturbations into images. However, the work (Song et al.,
2018) introduces a method to generate unrestricted adversar-
ial examples. These samples do not necessarily look exactly
the same as the victim samples, but are still legitimate sam-
ples for human eyes and can fool the classifier. Previous
successful defense strategies that target perturbation-based
attacks fail to recognize them.
In order to attack a given classifier C, Song et al. pre-
trained an Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Net-
work (AC-GAN), (Odena et al., 2017), so they can generate
one legitimate sample x from a noise vector z0 from class y.
Then, to craft an adversarial example, they will find a noise
vector z near z0, but require that the output of AC-GAN
generator G(z) be wrongly classified by victim model C.
Because z is near z0 in the latent space of the AC-GAN,
its output should belong to the same class y. In this way,
the generated sample G(z) is different from x, misleading
classifier F , but it is still a legitimate sample.
3.2. Physical World Attack
All the previously introduced attack methods are applied
digitally, where the adversary supplies input images directly
to the machine learning model. However, this is not always
the case for some scenarios, like those that use cameras,
microphones or other sensors to receive the signals as input.
In this case, can we still attack these systems by generating
physical-world adversarial objects? Recent works show
that such attacks do exist. For example, in (Eykholt et al.,
2017), stickers are attached to road signs that can severely
threaten autonomous cars’ sign recognizer. These kinds of
adversarial objects are more destructive for deep learning
models because they can directly challenge many practical
applications of DNNs, such as face recognition, autonomous
vehicle, etc.
3.2.1. EXPLORING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN
PHYSICAL WORLD
In (Kurakin et al., 2016b), authors explore the feasibility of
crafting physical adversarial objects, by checking whether
the generated adversarial images (FGSM, BIM) are “robust”
under natural transformation (such as changing viewpoint,
lighting etc.). Here, “robust” means the crafted images
remain adversarial after the transformation. To apply the
transformation, they print out the crafted images, and let test
subjects use cellphones to take photos of these printouts. In
this process, the shooting angle or lighting environment are
not constrained, so the acquired photos are transformed sam-
ples from previously generated adversarial examples. The
experimental results demonstrate that after transformation, a
large portion of these adversarial examples, especially those
generated by FGSM, remain adversarial to the classifier.
These results suggest the possibility of physical adversarial
objects which can fool the sensor under different environ-
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ments.
3.2.2. EYKHOLT’S ATTACK ON ROAD SIGNS
The work (Eykholt et al., 2017), shown in figure 5, crafts
physical adversarial objects by “contaminating” road signs
to mislead road sign recognizers. They achieve the attack
by putting stickers on the stop sign in the desired positions.
The approach consists of: (1) Implement l1-norm based
attack (those attacks that constrain ||x′ − x||1) on digital
images of road signs to roughly find the region to perturb
(l1 attacks render sparse perturbation, which helps to find
the attack location). These regions will later be the location
of stickers. (2) Concentrate on the regions found in step 1,
and use an l2-norm based attack to generate the color for
the stickers. (3) Print out the perturbation found in steps 1
and 2, and stick them on road sign. The perturbed stop sign
can confuse an autonomous vehicle from any distance and
viewpoint.
Figure 5. The attacker puts some stickers on a road sign to confuse
an autonomous vehicle’s road sign recognizer from any viewpoint.
(Image Credit: (Eykholt et al., 2017))
3.2.3. ATHALYE’S 3D ADVERSARIAL OBJECT
The work (Athalye et al., 2017) reported the first work which
successfully crafted physical 3D adversarial objects. As
shown in figure 6, the authors use 3D-printing to manu-
facture an “adversarial” turtle. To achieve the goal, they
implement a 3D rendering technique. Given a textured 3D
object, they first optimize the object’s texture such that the
rendering images are adversarial from any viewpoint. In
this process, they also ensure that the perturbation remains
adversarial under different environments: camera distance,
lighting conditions, rotation and background. After finding
the perturbation on 3D rendering, they print an instance of
the 3D object.
3.3. Black-Box Attacks
3.3.1. SUBSTITUTE MODEL
The work of (Papernot et al., 2017) was the first to intro-
duce an effective algorithm to attack DNN classifiers, under
Figure 6. The image classifier fails to correctly recognize the ad-
versarial object, but the original object can be correctly predicted
with 100% accuracy. (Image Credit: (Athalye et al., 2017))
the condition that the adversary has no access to the classi-
fier’s parameters or training set (black-box). An adversary
can only feed input x to obtain the output label y from the
classifier. Additionally, the adversary may have only par-
tial knowledge about: (a) the classifier’s data domain (e.g.
handwritten digits, photographs, human faces) and (b) the
architecture of the classifier (e.g., CNNs, RNNs).
The work Papernot et al. (2017) exploits the “transferability”
(section 5.3) property of adversarial examples: a sample x′
can attack F1, it is also likely to attack F2, which has similar
structures to F1. Thus, the authors introduce a method to
train a substitute model F ′ to imitate the target victim clas-
sifier F , and then craft the adversarial example by attacking
substitute model F ′. The main steps are as follows:
1. Synthesize Substitute Training Dataset
Make a “replica” training set. For example, to attack
a victim classifier for the hand-written digits recogni-
tion task, make an initial substitute training set by: (a)
requiring samples from test set; or (b) handcrafting
samples.
2. Train the Substitute Model
Feed the substitute training dataset X into the victim
classifier to obtain their labels Y . Choose one substi-
tute DNN model to train on (X,Y ) to get F ′. Based
on the attacker’s knowledge, the chosen DNN should
have similar structures to the victim model.
3. Augment Dataset
Augment the dataset (X,Y ) and retrain the substitute
model F ′ iteratively. This procedure helps to increase
the diversity of the replica training set and improve the
accuracy of substitute model F ′.
4. Attack the Substitute Model
Utilize the previously introduced attack methods, such
as FGSM, to attack the model F ′. The generated ad-
versarial examples are also very likely to mislead the
target model F , by the property of “transferability”.
What kind of attack algorithm should we choose to attack
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substitute model? The success of the substitute model black-
box attack is based on the “transferability” property of adver-
sarial examples. Thus, during black-box attack, we choose
attacks that have high transferability, like FGSM, PGD and
momentum-based iterative attacks (Dong et al., 2018).
3.3.2. ZOO: ZEROTH ORDER OPTIMIZATION BASED
BLACK-BOX ATTACK
Different from the work in section 3.3.1 where an adversary
can only obtain the label information from the classifier,
it assumes that the attacker has access to the prediction
confidence (score) from the victim classifier’s output(Chen
et al., 2017). In this case, there is no need to build the
substitute training set and substitute model. Chen et al. give
an algorithm to “scrape” the gradient information around
victim sample x by observing the changes in the prediction
confidence F (x) as the pixel values of x are tuned.
The equation 4 shows for each index i of sample x, we add
(or subtract) xi by h. If h is small enough, we can scrape
the gradient information from the output of F (·) by:
∂F (x)
∂xi
≈ F (x+ hei)− F (x− hei)
2h
(4)
Utilizing the approximate gradient, we can apply the attack
formulations introduced in Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.1.7.
The success rate of ZOO is higher than substitute model
(Section 3.3.1) because it can utilize the information of
prediction confidence, instead of solely the predicted labels.
3.3.3. QUERY-EFFICIENT BLACK-BOX ATTACK
Previously introduced black-box attacks require lots of in-
put queries to the classifier, which may be prohibitive in
practical applications. There are some studies on improving
the efficiency of generating black-box adversarial examples
via a limited number of queries. For example, a more effi-
cient way is introduced to estimate the gradient information
from model outputs (Ilyas et al., 2018). It uses Natural
Evolutional Strategies (Wierstra et al., 2014) to sample the
model’s output based on the queries around x, and estimate
the expectation of gradient of F on x. This procedure re-
quires fewer queries to the model. Moreover, a genetic
algorithm is applied to search the neighbors of a benign
image for adversarial examples (Alzantot et al., 2018).
3.4. Semi-white (Grey) box Attack
In (Xiao et al., 2018a), a semi-white box attack framework is
introduced. It first trained a Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014a), targeting the model of
interest. The attacker can then craft adversarial examples
directly from the generative network. The advantage of
the GAN-based attack is that it accelerates the process of
producing adversarial examples, and makes more natural
and more undetectable samples. Later, in (Deb et al., 2019),
GAN is used to generate adversarial faces to evade the face
recognition software. Their crafted face images appear to
be more natural and have barely distinguishable difference
from target face images.
3.5. Poisoning attacks
The attacks we have discussed so far are evasion attacks,
which are launched after the classification model is trained.
Some works instead craft adversarial examples before train-
ing. These adversarial examples are inserted into the train-
ing set in order to undermine the overall accuracy of the
learned classifier, or influence its prediction on certain test
examples. This process is called a poisoning attack.
Usually, the adversary in a poisoning attack setting has
knowledge about the architecture of the model which is
later trained on the poisoned dataset. Poisoning attacks
frequently applied to attack graph neural network, because
of the GNN’s specific transductive learning procedure. Here,
we introduce studies that craft image poisoning attacks.
3.5.1. BIGGIO’S POISONING ATTACK ON SVM
The work of (Biggio et al., 2012) introduced a method to
poison the training set in order to reduce SVM model’s
accuracy. In their setting, they try to figure out a poison
sample xc which, when inserted into the training set, will
result in the learned SVM model Fxc having a large total
loss on the whole validation set. They achieve this by using
incremental learning techniques for SVMs (Cauwenberghs
& Poggio, 2001), which can model the influence of training
samples on the learned SVM model.
A poisoning attack based on procedure above is quite suc-
cessful for SVM models. However, for deep learning mod-
els, it is not easy to explicitly figure out the influence of
training samples on the trained model. Below we introduce
some approaches for applying poisoning attacks on DNN
models.
3.5.2. KOH’S MODEL EXPLANATION
In (Koh & Liang, 2017), a method is introduced to interpret
deep neural networks: how would the model’s predictions
change if a training sample were modified? Their model
can explicitly quantify the change in the final loss with-
out retraining the model when only one training sample is
modified. This work can be naturally adopted to poisoning
attacks by finding those training samples that have large
influence on model’s prediction.
3.5.3. POISON FROGS
In (Shafahi et al., 2018a), a method is introduced to insert
an adversarial image with true label to the training set, in
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order to cause the trained model to wrongly classify a target
test sample. In this work, given a target test sample xt with
the true label yt, the attacker first uses a base sample xb
from class yb. Then, it solves the objective to find x′:
x′ = argmin
x
||Z(x)− Z(xt)||22 + β||x− xb||22.
After inserting the poison sample x′ into the training set,
the new model trained on Xtrain + {x}′ will classify x′ as
class yb, because of the small distance between x′ and xb.
Using a new trained model to predict xt, the objective of
x′ forces the score vector of xt and x′ to be close. Thus, x′
and xt will have the same prediction outcome. In this way,
the new trained model will predict the target sample xt as
class yb.
4. Countermeasures Against Adversarial
Examples
In order to protect the security of deep learning models, dif-
ferent strategies have been considered as countermeasures
against adversarial examples. There are basically three main
categories of these countermeasures:
1. Gradient Masking/Obfuscation
Since most attack algorithms are based on the gradient
information of the classifier, masking or hiding the
gradients will confound the adversaries.
2. Robust Optimization
Re-learning a DNN classifier’s parameters can increase
its robustness. The trained classifier will correctly clas-
sify the subsequently generated adversarial examples.
3. Adversarial Examples Detection
It studies the distribution of natural/benign examples,
detects adversarial examples and disallows their input
into the classifier
4.1. Gradient Masking/Obfuscation
Gradient masking/obfuscation refers to the strategy where a
defender deliberately hides the gradient information of the
model, in order to confuse the adversaries, since most attack
algorithms are based on the classifier’s gradient information.
4.1.1. DEFENSIVE DISTILLATION
“Distillation”, first introduced by (Hinton et al., 2015), is a
training technique to reduce the size of DNN architectures.
It fulfills its goal by training a smaller-size DNN model on
the logits (outputs of the last layer before softmax).
In (Papernot et al., 2016b), it reformulates the procedure of
distillation to train a DNN model that can resist adversarial
examples, such as FGSM, Szegedy’s L-BFGS Attack or
DeepFool. It designs the training process as:
(1) Train a network F on the given training set (X,Y ) by
setting the temperature1 of the softmax to T .
(2) Compute the scores (after softmax) given by F (X)
again and evaluate the scores at temperature T .
(3) Train another network F ′T using softmax at tempera-
ture T on the dataset with soft labels (X,F (X)). We
refer the model F ′T as the distilled model.
(4) Use the distilled network F ′T with softmax at temper-
ature 1, which is denoted as F ′1 during prediction on
test data Xtest (or adversarial examples),
In Carlini & Wagner (2017b), it explains why this algorithm
works: When we train a distilled network F ′T at temperature
T and test it at temperature 1, we effectively cause the inputs
to the softmax to become larger by a factor of T. Let us
say T = 100, the logits Z(·) for sample x and its neighbor
points x′ will be 100 times larger. It will lead to the softmax
function F1(·) = softmax(Z(·), 1) outputting a score vector
like (, , ..., 1− (m− 1), , ..., ), where the target output
class has a score extremely close to 1, and all other classes
have scores close to 0. In practice, the value of  is so small
that its 32-bit floating-point value for computer is rounded
to 0. In this way, the computer cannot find the gradient of
score function F ′1, which inhibits the gradient-based attacks.
4.1.2. SHATTERED GRADIENTS
Some studies(Buckman et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017) try to
protect the model by preprocessing the input data. They add
a non-smooth or non-differentiable preprocessor g(·) and
then train a DNN model f on g(X). The trained classifier
f(g(·)) is not differentiable in term of x, causing the failure
of adversarial attacks.
For example, Thermometer Encoding (Buckman et al., 2018)
uses a preprocessor to discretize an image’s pixel value xi
into a l-dimensional vector τ(xi). (e.g. when l = 10,
τ(0.66) = 1111110000). The vector τ(xi) acts as a “ther-
mometer” to record the pixel xi’s value. A DNN model is
later trained on these vectors. The work in (Guo et al., 2017)
studies a number of image processing tools, such as image
cropping, compressing or total-variance minimization, to de-
termine whether these techniques help to protect the model
against adversarial examples. All these approaches block
up the smooth connection between the model’s output and
the original input samples, so the attacker cannot easily find
the gradient ∂F (x)∂x for attacking.
1Note that the softmax function at a temperature T means:
softmax(x, T )i =
exi/T∑
j e
xj/T
, where i = 0, 2, ...,K − 1
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4.1.3. STOCHASTIC/RANDOMIZED GRADIENTS
Some defense strategies try to randomize the DNN model in
order to confound the adversary. For instance, we train a set
of classifiers s = {Ft : t = 1, 2, ..., k}. During evaluation
on data x, we randomly select one classifier from the set s
and predict the label y. Because the adversary has no idea
which classifier is used by the prediction model, the attack
success rate will be reduced.
Some examples of this strategy include the work in (Dhillon
et al., 2018) that randomly drops some neurons of each layer
of the DNN model, and the work in (Xie et al., 2017a) that
resizes the input images to a random size and pads zeros
around the input image.
4.1.4. EXPLODING & VANISHING GRADIENTS
Both PixelDefend (Song et al., 2017) and Defense-GAN
(Samangouei et al., 2018) suggest using generative mod-
els to project a potential adversarial example onto the be-
nign data manifold before classifying them. While PixelDe-
fend uses PixelCNN generative model (Van den Oord et al.,
2016), Defense-GAN utilizes a GAN architecture (Goodfel-
low et al., 2014a). The generative models can be viewed as
a purifier that transforms adversarial examples into benign
examples.
Both of these methods add a generative network before
the classifier DNN, which will cause the final classification
model to be an extremely deep neural network. The un-
derlying reason that these defenses succeed is because: the
cumulative product of partial derivatives from each layer
will cause the gradient ∂L(x)∂x to be extremely small or irregu-
larly large, which prevents the attacker accurately estimating
the location of adversarial examples.
4.1.5. GRADIENT MASKING/OBFUSCATION METHODS
ARE NOT SAFE
The work in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) shows that the
method of “Defensive Distillation” (section 4.1.1) is still
vulnerable to their adversarial examples. The work in (Atha-
lye et al., 2018) devises different attacking algorithms to
break gradient masking/obfuscation defending strategies
(Section (4.1.2), Section (4.1.3), Section (4.1.4)). The main
weakness of the gradient masking strategy is that: it can
only “confound” the adversaries, but it cannot eliminate the
existence of adversarial examples.
4.2. Robust Optimization
Robust optimization methods aim to improve the classifier’s
robustness (Section (2.2)) by changing DNN model’s man-
ner of learning. They study how to learn model parameters
that can give promising predictions on potential adversar-
ial examples. In this field, the works majorly focus on:
(1) learning model parameters θ∗ to minimize the average
adversarial loss: (Section 2.2.2)
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈Θ
E
x∼D
max
||x′−x||≤
L(θ, x′, y) (5)
or (2) learning model parameters θ∗ to maximize the average
minimal perturbation distance: (Section 2.2.1)
θ∗ = argmax
θ∈Θ
E
x∼D
min
C(x′)6=y
||x′ − x||. (6)
Typically, a robust optimization algorithm should have a
prior knowledge of its potential threat or potential attack
(adversarial space D). Then, the defenders build classifiers
which are safe against this specific attack. For most of
the related works (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin et al.,
2016b; Madry et al., 2017), they aim to defend against ad-
versarial examples generated from small lp (specifically l∞
and l2) norm perturbation. Even though there is a chance
that these defenses are still vulnerable to attacks from other
mechanisms, (e.g. (Xiao et al., 2018b)), studying the secu-
rity against lp attack is fundamental and can be generalized
to other attacks.
In this section, we concentrate on defense approaches using
robustness optimization against lp attacks. We categorize
the related works into three groups: (a) regularization meth-
ods, (b) adversarial (re)training and (c) certified defenses.
4.2.1. REGULARIZATION METHODS
Some early studies on defending against adversarial exam-
ples focus on exploiting certain properties that a robust DNN
should have in order to resist adversarial examples. For ex-
ample, in (Szegedy et al., 2013), it suggests that a robust
model should be stable when its inputs are distorted, so they
turn to constrain the Lipschitz constant to impose this “sta-
bility” of model output. Training on these regularizations
can sometimes heuristically help the model be more robust.
1. Penalize Layers’ Lipschitz Constant
When first claimed the vulnerability of DNN models
to adversarial examples, authors in (Szegedy et al.,
2013) suggested that adding regularization terms on the
parameters during training can force the trained model
to be stable. It suggested constraining the Lipschitz
constant Lk between any two layers:
∀x, δ, ||hk(x;Wk)− hk(x+ δ;Wk)|| ≤ Lk||δ||,
so that the outcome of each layer will not be easily
influenced by the small distortion of its input. The work
(Cisse et al., 2017) formalized this idea, by claiming
that the model’s adversarial risk (5) is right dependent
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on this instability Lk:
E
x∼D
Ladv(x) ≤ E
x∼D
L(x)
+ E
x∼D
[ max
||x′−x||≤
|L(F (x′), y)− L(F (x), y)|]
≤ E
x∼D
L(x) + λp
K∏
k=1
Lk
where λp is the Lipschitz constant of the loss function.
This formula states that during the training process,
penalizing the large instability for each hidden layer
can help to decrease the adversarial risk of the model,
and consequently increase the robustness of model.
The idea of constraining instability also appears in the
work (Miyato et al., 2015) for semi-supervised, and
unsupervised defenses.
2. Penalize Layers’ Partial Derivative
The work in (Gu & Rigazio, 2014) introduced a Deep
Contractive Network algorithm to regularize the train-
ing. It was inspired by the Contractive Autoencoder
(Rifai et al., 2011), which was introduced to denoise
the encoded representation learning. The Deep Con-
tractive Network suggests adding a penalty on the par-
tial derivatives at each layer into the standard back-
propagation framework, so that the change of the input
data will not cause large change on the output of each
layer. Thus, it becomes difficult for the classifier to
give different predictions on perturbed data samples.
4.2.2. ADVERSARIAL (RE)TRAINING
(i) Adversarial Training with FGSM
The work in (Goodfellow et al., 2014b) is the first to
suggest feeding generated adversarial examples into
the training process. By adding the adversarial exam-
ples with true label (x′, y) into the training set, the
training set will tell the classifier that x′ belongs to
class y, so that the trained model will correctly predict
the label of future adversarial examples.
In the work (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), they use non-
targeted FGSM (Section (3.1.3)) to generate adversar-
ial examples x′ for the training dataset:
x′ = x+ sign(∇xL(θ, x, y)),
By training on benign samples augmented with adver-
sarial examples, they increase the robustness against
adversarial examples generated by FGSM.
The training strategy of this method is changed in (Ku-
rakin et al., 2016b) so that the model can be scaled
to larger dataset such as ImageNet. They suggest that
using batch normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015)
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training with FGSM by batches
Randomly initialize network F
repeat
1. Read minibatch B = {x1, ..., xm} from training set
2. Generate k adversarial examples {x1adv, ...xkadv} for
corresponding benign examples using current state of
the network F .
3. Update B′ = {x1adv, ..., xkadv, xk+1, ..., xm}
Do one training step of network F using minibatch B′
until training converged
should improve the efficiency of adversarial training.
We give a short sketch of their algorithm in Algorithm
(1).
The trained classifier has good robustness on FGSM
attacks, but it is still vulnerable to iterative attacks.
Later, the work in (Trame`r et al., 2017) argues that
this defense is also vulnerable to single-step attacks.
Adversarial training with FGSM will cause gradient
obfuscation (Section (4.1)), where there is an extreme
non-smoothness of the trained classifier F near the test
sample x.
(ii) Adversarial Training with PGD
The work in (Madry et al., 2017) suggests using Pro-
jected Gradient Descent attack (Section (3.1.6)) for
adversarial training, instead of using single-step at-
tacks like FGSM. The PGD attacks (Section (3.1.6))
can be seen as a heuristic method to find the “most
adversarial” example in the l∞ ball around x: B(x):
xadv = argmax
x′∈B(x)
L(x′, F ) (7)
Here, the most-adversarial example xadv is the loca-
tion where the classifier F is most likely to be mis-
Loss function around 𝑥 Zoom the Loss function 
around 𝑥
Figure 7. Illustration of gradient masking for adversarial training
via FGSM. It plots the loss function of the trained classifier around
x on the grids of gradient direction and another randomly chosen
direction. We can see that the gradient poorly approximates the
global loss. (Image Credit: (Trame`r et al., 2017))
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Images, Graphs and Text: A Review
led. When training the DNN model on these most-
adversarial examples, it actually solves the problem
of learning model parameters θ that minimize the ad-
versarial loss (5). If the trained model has small loss
value on these most-adversarial examples, the model
is safe at everywhere in x’s neighbor ball B(x). One
thing to note is: this method trains the model only on
adversarial examples, instead of a mix of benign and
adversarial examples. The training algorithm is shown
in Algorithm (2).
The trained model under this method demonstrates
good robustness against both single-step and iterative
attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. However,
this method involves an iterative attack for all the train-
ing samples. Thus, the time complexity of this adver-
sarial training will be k (using k-step PGD) times as
large as that for natural training, and as a consequence,
it is hard to scale to large datasets such as ImageNet.
(iii) Ensemble Adversarial Training
The work in (Trame`r et al., 2017) introduced an adver-
sarial training method which can protect CNN models
against single-step attacks and can be also applied to
large datasets such as ImageNet.
The main approach is to augment the classifier’s train-
ing set with adversarial examples crafted from other
pre-trained classifiers. For example, if we aim to train a
robust classifier F , we can first pre-train classifiers F1,
F2, and F3 as references. These models have different
hyperparameters with model F . Then, for each sample
x, we use a single-step attack FGSM to craft adversar-
ial examples on F1, F2 and F3 to get x1adv , x
2
adv , x
3
adv .
Because of the transferability property (section 5.3) of
the single-step attacks across different models, x1adv,
x2adv , x
3
adv are also likely to mislead the classifier F . It
means that these samples are a good approximation for
the “most adversarial” example (7) for model F on x.
Training on these samples together will approximately
minimize the adversarial loss in (5).
This ensemble adversarial training algorithm is more
efficient than these in Section (i) and Section (ii), since
it decouples the process of model training and gener-
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Training with PGD
Randomly initialize network F
repeat
1. Read minibatch B = {x1, ..., xm} from training set
2. Generate m adversarial examples {x1adv, ...xmadv}
by PGD attack using current state of the network F .
3. Update B′ = {x1adv, ..., xmadv}
Do one training step of network F using minibatch B′
until training converged
Algorithm 3 Free Adversarial Training
Randomly initialize network F
repeat
1. Read minibatch B = {x1, ..., xm} from training set
2. for i = 1...m do
(a) Update model parameter θ
gθ ← E(x,y)∈B [∇θL(x+ δ, y, θ)]
gadv ← ∇xL(x+ δ, y, θ)
θ ← θ − αgθ
(b) Generate adversarial examples
δ ← δ +  · sign(gadv)
δ ← clip(δ,−, )
3. Update minibatchB with adversarial examples x+δ
until training converged
ating adversarial examples. The experimental results
show that this method can provide robustness against
single-step and black-box attacks on the ImageNet
dataset.
(iv) Accelerate Adversarial Training
While it is one of the most promising and reliable de-
fense strategies, adversarial training with PGD attack
(Madry et al., 2017) is generally slow and computation-
ally costly.
The work in (Shafahi et al., 2019) proposes a free adver-
sarial training algorithm which improves the efficiency
by reusing the backward pass calculations. In this algo-
rithm, the gradient of the loss to input: ∂L(x+δ,θ)∂x and
the gradient of the loss to model parameters: ∂L(x+δ,θ)∂θ
can be computed together in one back propagation iter-
ation, by sharing the same components of chain rule.
Thus, the adversarial training process is highly acceler-
ated. The free adversarial training algorithm is shown
in Algorithm (3).
The work in (Zhang et al., 2019a) argues that when the
model parameters are fixed, the PGD-generated adver-
sarial example is only coupled with the weights of the
first layer of DNN. It is based on solving a Pontrya-
gin’s Maximal Principle (Pontryagin, 2018). There-
fore, the work in (Zhang et al., 2019a) develops an
algorithm You Only Propagate Once (YOPO) to reuse
the gradient of the loss to the model’s first layer out-
put ∂L(x+δ,θ)∂Z1(x) during generating PGD attacks. In this
way, YOPO avoids a large amount of times to access
the gradient and therefore it reduces the computational
cost.
4.2.3. PROVABLE DEFENSES
Adversarial training has been shown to be effective in pro-
tecting models against adversarial examples. However, this
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is still no formal guarantee about the safety of the trained
classifiers. We will never know whether there are more ag-
gressive attacks that can break those defenses, so directly ap-
plying these adversarial training algorithms in safety-critical
tasks would be irresponsible.
As we mentioned in Section (3.1.8), the work (Carlini et al.,
2017) was the first to introduce a Reluplex algorithm to
seriously verify the robustness of DNN models: when the
model F is given, the algorithm figures out the exact value
of minimal perturbation distance r(x;F ). This is to say, the
classifier is safe against any perturbations with norm less
than r(x;F ). If we apply Reluplex on the whole test set,
we can tell what percentage of samples are absolutely safe
against perturbations less than norm r0. In this way, we
gain confidence and reduce the expected risk when building
DNN models.
The method of Reluplex seeks to find the exact value of
r(x;F ) that can verify the model F ’s robustness on x. Al-
ternately, works such as (Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Wong
& Kolter, 2017; Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) try to
find trainable “certificates” C(x;F ) to verify the model
robustness. For example, in (Hein & Andriushchenko,
2017), a certificate C(x, F ) is calculated for model F on x,
which is a lower bound of minimal perturbation distance:
C(x, F ) ≤ r(x, F ). As shown in Figure (8), the model
must be safe against any perturbation with norm limited by
C(x, F ). Moreover, these certificates are trainable. Training
to optimize these certificates will grant good robustness to
the classifier. In this section, we’ll briefly introduce some
methods to design these certificates.
(i) Lower Bound of Minimal Perturbation
The work in (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017) derives
a lower bound C(x, F ) for the minimal perturbation
distance of F on x based on Cross-Lipschitz Theorem:
max
>0
min{min
i6=y
Zy(x)− Zi(x)
maxx′∈B(x) ||∇Zy(x′)−∇Zi(x′)||
, }
The detailed derivation can be found in (Hein & An-
driushchenko, 2017). Note that the formulation of
C(x, F ) only depends on F and x, and it is easy to
calculate for a neural network with one hidden layer.
The model F thus can be proved to be safe in the re-
gion within distance C(x, F ). Training to maximize
this lower bound will make the classifier more robust.
(ii) Upper Bound of Adversarial Loss
The works in (Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Wong &
Kolter, 2017) aim to solve the same problem. They try
to find an upper bound U(x, F ) which is larger than
adversarial loss Ladv(x, F ):
Ladv(x) = max
x′
{max
i 6=y
Zi(x
′)− Zy(x′)}
subject to x′ ∈ B(x)
(8)
𝑟(𝑥, 𝐹)
𝐶(𝑥, 𝐹)
Figure 8. The derived certificate C(x, F ) is a lower bound of mini-
mal perturbation distance ρ(x, F ). The model is safe in C(x, F )
ball.
Recall that in Section (2.2.2), we introduced the func-
tion maxi 6=y Zi(x′)−Zy(x′) as a type of loss function
called margin loss.
The certificate U(x, F ) acts in this way: if U(x, F ) <
0, then adversarial loss L(x, F ) < 0. Thus, the classi-
fier always gives the largest score to the true label y in
the region B(x), and the model is safe in this region.
To increase the model’s robustness, we should learn
parameters that have the smallest U value, so that more
and more data samples will have negative U values.
The work (Raghunathan et al., 2018a) uses integra-
tion inequalities to derive the certificate and use semi-
definite programming (SDP) (Vandenberghe & Boyd,
1996) to solve the certificate. In contrast, the work
(Wong & Kolter, 2017) transforms the problem (8) into
a linear programming problem and solves the prob-
lem via training an alternative neural network. Both
methods only consider neural networks with one hid-
den layer. There are also studies (Raghunathan et al.,
2018b; Wong et al., 2018) that improved the efficiency
and scalability of these algorithms.
Furthermore, the work in (Sinha et al., 2017) com-
bines adversarial training and provable defense to-
gether. They train the classifier by feeding adversarial
examples which are sampled from the distribution of
worst-case perturbation, and derive the certificates by
studying the Lagrangian duality of adversarial loss.
4.3. Adversarial Example Detection
Adversarial example detection is another main approach to
protect DNN classifiers. Instead of predicting the model’s
input directly, these methods first distinguish whether the
input is benign or adversarial. Then, if it can detect that
the input is adversarial, the DNN classifier will refuse to
predict its label. In (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), it sorts the
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threat models into 3 categories that the detection techniques
should deal with:
1. A Zero-Knowledge Adversary only has access to the
classifier F ’s parameters, and has no knowledge of the
detection model D.
2. A Perfect-Knowledge Adversary is aware of the model
F , and the detection scheme D and its parameters.
3. A Limited-Knowledge Adversary is aware of the model
F and the detection scheme D, but it does not have
access to D’s parameters. That is, this adversary does
not know the model’s training set.
In all these threat settings, the detection tools are required
to correctly classify the adversarial examples, and have low
possibility of misclassifying benign examples. Next, we
will go through some main methods for adversarial example
detection.
4.3.1. AN AUXILIARY MODEL TO CLASSIFY
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Some works focus on designin auxiliary models that aim
to distinguish adversarial examples from benign examples.
The work in (Grosse et al., 2017) trains a DNN model with
|Y| = K+1 labels, with an additional label for all adversar-
ial examples, so that network will assign adversarial exam-
ples into the K + 1 class. Similarly, the work (Gong et al.,
2017) trains a binary classification model to discriminate all
adversarial examples apart from benign samples, and then
trains a classifier on recognized benign samples. The work
in (Metzen et al., 2017a) proposes a detection method to
construct an auxiliary neural network D which takes inputs
from the values of hidden nodes H of the natural trained
classifier. The trained detection classifier D : H → [0, 1] is
a binary classification model that distinguishes adversarial
examples from benign ones by the hidden layers.
4.3.2. USING STATISTICS TO DISTINGUISH
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Some early works heuristically study the differences in the
statistical properties of adversarial examples and benign
examples. For example, in (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016),
adversarial examples are found to place a higher weight on
the larger (later) principle components where the natural
images have larger weight on early principle components.
Thus, they can split them by PCA.
In (Grosse et al., 2017), it uses a statistical test: Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (MMD) test (Gretton et al., 2012), which
is used to test whether two datasets are drawn from the same
distribution. They use this testing tool to test whether a
group of data points are benign or adversarial.
4.3.3. CHECKING THE PREDICTION CONSISTENCY
Other studies focus on checking the consistency of the sam-
ple x’s prediction outcome. They usually manipulate the
model parameters or the input examples themselves, to
check whether the outputs of the classifier have significant
changes. These are based on the belief that the classifier
will have stable predictions on natural examples under these
manipulations.
The work in (Feinman et al., 2017) randomizes the classifier
using Dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014). If these classifiers
give very different prediction outcomes on x after random-
ization, this sample x is very likely to be an adversarial
one.
The work in (Xu et al., 2017) manipulates the input sam-
ple itself to check the consistency. For each input sample
x, it reduces the color depth of the image (e.g. one 8-bit
grayscale image with 256 possible values for each pixel be-
comes a 7-bit with 128 possible values), as shown in Figure
9. It hypothesizes that for natural images, reducing the color
Figure 9. Images from MNIST and CIFAR10. From left to right,
the color depth is reduced from 8-bit, 7-bit,...,2-bit,1-bit. (Image
Credit: (Xu et al., 2017))
depth will not change the prediction result, but the predic-
tion on adversarial examples will change. In this way, they
can detect adversarial examples. Similar to reducing the
color depth, the work (Feinman et al., 2017) also introduced
other feature squeezing methods such as spatial smoothing.
4.3.4. SOME ATTACKS WHICH EVADE ADVERSARIAL
DETECTION
The work in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) bypassed 10 of the
detection methods which fall into the three categories above.
The feature squeezing methods were broken by (Sharma
& Chen, 2018), which introduced a “stronger” adversarial
attack.
The authors in (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) claim that the
properties which are intrinsic to adversarial examples are
not very easy to find. They also gave several suggestions on
future detection works:
1. Randomization can increase the required attacking distortion.
2. Defenses that directly manipulate on raw pixel values are
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ineffective.
3. Evaluation should be down on multiple datasets besides
MNIST.
4. Report false positive and true positive rates for detection.
5. Use a strong attack and simply focusing on white-box attacks
is risky.
5. Explanations for the Existence of
Adversarial Examples
In addition to crafting adversarial examples and defending
them, explaining the reason behind these phenomena is also
important. In this section, we briefly introduce the recent
works and hypotheses on the key questions of adversarial
learning. We hope our introduction will give our audience
a basic view on the existing ideas and solutions for these
questions.
5.1. Why Do Adversarial Examples Exist?
Some original works such as (Szegedy et al., 2013), state
that the existence of adversarial examples is due to the fact
that DNN models do not generalize well in low probability
space of data. The generalization issue may be caused by
the high complexity of DNN model structures.
However, even linear models are also vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014b). Furthermore, in
the work (Madry et al., 2017), they implement experiments
to show that an increase in model capacity will improve the
model robustness.
Some insight can be gained about the existence of adver-
sarial examples by studying the model’s decision boundary.
The adversarial examples are almost always close to de-
cision boundary of a natural trained model, which may be
because the decision boundary is too flat (Fawzi et al., 2016),
too curved (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017b), or inflexible
(Fawzi et al., 2018).
Studying the reason behind the existence of adversarial
examples is important because it can guide us in designing
more robust models, and help us to understand existing deep
learning models. However, there is still no consensus on
this problem.
5.2. Can We Build an Optimal Classifier?
Many recent works hypothesize that it might be impossible
to build optimally robust classifier. For example, the work
in (Shafahi et al., 2018b) claims that adversarial examples
are inevitable because the distribution of data in each class
is not well-concentrated, which leaves room for adversarial
examples. In this vein, the work (Schmidt et al., 2018)
claims that to improve the robustness of a trained model,
it is necessary to collect more data. Moreover, the work
in (Tsipras et al., 2018) suggests that even if we can build
models with high robustness, it must take cost of some
accuracy.
5.3. What is Transferability?
Transferability is one of the key properties of adversarial
examples. It means that the adversarial examples generated
to target one victim model also have a high probability of
misleading other models.
Some works compare the transferability between different
attacking algorithms. In (Kurakin et al., 2016a), they claim
that in ImageNet, single step attacks (FGSM) are more likely
to transfer between models than iterative attacks (BIM) un-
der same perturbation intensity.
The property of transferability is frequently utilized in at-
tacking techniques in black-box setting (Papernot et al.,
2017). If the model parameters are veiled to attackers, they
can turn to attack other substitute models and enjoy the
transferability of their generated samples. The property of
transferability is also utilized by defending methods as in
(Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016): since the adversarial exam-
ples for model A are also likely to be adversarial for model
B, adversarial training using adversarial examples from B
will help defend A.
6. Graph Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples also exist in graph-structured data
(Zu¨gner et al., 2018; Dai et al., 2018). Attackers usually
slightly modify the graph structure and node features, in
an effort to cause the graph neural networks (GNNs) to
give wrong prediction for node classification or graph clas-
sification tasks. These adversarial attacks therefore raise
concerns on the security of applying GNN models. For
example, a bank needs to build a reliable credit evaluation
system where their model should not be easily attacked by
malicious manipulations.
There are some distinct differences between attacking graph
models and attacking traditional image classifiers:
• Non-Independence Samples of the graph-structured
data are not independent: changing one’s feature or
connection will influence the prediction on others.
• Poisoning Attacks Graph neural networks are usually
performed in a transductive learning setting for node
classification: the test data are also used to trained the
classifier. This means that we modify the test data, the
trained classifier is also changed.
• Discreteness When modifying the graph structure, the
search space for adversarial example is discrete. Previ-
ous gradient methods to find adversarial examples may
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be invalid in this case.
Below are the methods used by some successful works to
attack and defend graph neural networks.
6.1. Definitions for Graphs and Graph Models
In this section, the notations and definitions of the graph
structured data and graph neural network models are defined
below. A graph can be represented as G = {V, E}, where
V is a set of N nodes and E is a set of M edges. The edges
describe the connections between the nodes, which can
also be expressed by an adjacency matrixA ∈ {0, 1}N×N .
Furthermore, a graph G is called an attributed graph if each
node in V is associated with a d-dimensional attribute vector
xv ∈ Rd. The attributes for all the nodes in the graph can
be summarized as a matrix X ∈ RN×d, the i-th row of
which represents the attribute vector for node vi.
The goal of node classification is to learn a function g :
V → Y that maps each node to one class in Y , based on a
group of labeled nodes in G. One of the most successful
node classification models is Graph Convolutional Network
(GCN) (Kipf & Welling, 2016). The GCN model keeps
aggregating the information from neighboring nodes to learn
representations for each node v,
H(0) = X; H(l+1) = σ(AˆH(l)W l).
where σ is a non-linear activation function, the matrix Aˆ
is defined as Aˆ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 , A˜ = A + IN , and D˜ii =∑
j A˜ij . The last layer outputs the score vectors of each
node for prediction: H(m)v = F (v,X).
6.2. Zugner’s Greedy Method
In the work of (Zu¨gner et al., 2018), they consider attacking
node classification models, Graph Convolutional Networks
(Kipf & Welling, 2016), by modifying the nodes connec-
tions or node features (binary). In this setting, an adversary
is allowed to add/remove edges between nodes, or flip the
feature of nodes with limited number of operations. The
goal is to mislead the GCN model which is trained on the
perturbed graph (transductive learning) to give wrong pre-
dictions. In their work, they also specify three levels of
adversary capabilities: they can manipulate (1) all nodes,
(2) a set of nodes A including the target victim x, and (3) a
set of nodes A which does not include the target node x. A
sketch is shown in Figure 10.
Similar to the objective function in (Carlini & Wagner,
2017b) for image data, they formulate the graph attack-
ing problem as a search for a perturbed graph G′ such that
the learned GCN classifier Z∗ has the largest score margin:
max
i6=y
ln(Z∗y (v0, G
′))− ln(Z∗i (v0, G′)) (9)
Figure 10. Adding an edge to alter the prediction of Graph Convo-
lutional Network. (Image Credit: (Zu¨gner et al., 2018))
The authors solve this objective by finding perturbations on
a fixed, linearized substitute GCN classifier Gsub which is
trained on the clean graph. They use a heuristic algorithm
to find the most influential operations on graph Gsub (e.g.
removing/adding the edge or flipping the feature which
can cause largest increase in (9)). The experimental results
demonstrate that the adversarial operations are also effective
on the later trained classifier Z∗.
During the attacking process, the authors also impose two
key constraints to ensure the similarity of the perturbed
graph to the original one: (1) the degree distribution should
be maintained, and (2) two positive features which never
happen together in G should also not happen together in G′.
Later, some other graph attacking works (e.g. (Ma et al.,
2019)) suggest the eigenvalues/eigenvectors of the graph
Laplacian Matrix should also be maintained during attack-
ing, otherwise the attacks are easily detected. However,
there is still no firm consensus on how to formally define
the similarity between graphs and generate unnoticeable
perturbation.
6.3. Dai’s RL Method : RL-S2V
Different from Zugner’s greedy method, the work (Dai et al.,
2018) introduced a Reinforcement Learning method to at-
tack the graph neural networks. This work only considers
adding or removing edges to modify the graph structure.
In (Dai et al., 2018)’s setting, a node classifier F trained
on the clean graph G(0) = G is given, node classifier F
is unknown to the attacker, and the attacker is allowed to
modifym edges in total to alter F ’s prediction on the victim
node v0. The authors formulate this attacking mission as
a Q-Learning game (Mnih et al., 2013), with the defined
Markov Decision Process as below:
• State The state st is represented by the tuple (G(t), v0),
where G(t) is the modified graph with t iterative steps.
• Action To represent the action to add/remove edges, a
single action at time step t is at ∈ V×V , which means
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the edge to be added or removed.
• Reward In order to encourage actions to fool the clas-
sifier, we should give a positive reward if v0’s label is
altered. Thus, the authors define the reward function
as : r(st, at) = 0,∀t = 1, 2, ...,m− 1, and for the last
step:
r(sm, am) =
{
1 if C(v0, G(m)) 6= y
−1 if C(v0, G(m)) = y
• Termination The process stops once the agent finishes
modifying m edges.
The Q-Learning algorithm helps the adversary have knowl-
edge about which actions to take (add/remove which edge)
on the given state (current graph structure), in order to get
largest reward (change F ’s output).
6.4. Graph Structure Poisoning via Meta-Learning
Previous graph attack works only focus on attacking one sin-
gle victim node. The work in (Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann, 2019)
attempts to poison the graph so that the global node classifi-
cation performance of GCN can be undermined and made
almost useless. The approach is based on meta learning
(Finn et al., 2017), which is traditionally used for hyperpa-
rameter optimization, few-shot image recognition, and fast
reinforcement learning. In the work (Zu¨gner & Gu¨nnemann,
2019), they use meta learning technique which takes the
graph structure as the hyperparameter of the GCN model to
optimize. Using their algorithm to perturb 5% edges of a
CITESEER graph dataset, they can increase the misclassifi-
cation rate to over 30%.
6.5. Attack on Node Embedding
The work in (Bojcheski & Gu¨nnemann, 2018) studies how
to perturb the graph structure in order to corrupt the quality
of node embedding, and consequently hinder subsequent
learning tasks such as node classification or link prediction.
Specifically, they study DeepWalk (Perozzi et al., 2014) as
a random-walk based node embedding learning approach
and approximately find the graph which has the largest loss
of the learned node embedding.
6.6. ReWatt: Attacking Graph Classifier via Rewiring
The ReWatt method (Ma et al., 2019) attempts to attack the
graph classification models, where each input of the model
is a whole graph. The proposed algorithm can mislead the
model by making unnoticeable perturbations on graph.
In their attacking scheme, they utilize reinforcement learn-
ing to find a rewiring operation a = (v1, v2, v3) at each
step, which is a set of 3 nodes. The first two nodes were
connected in the original graph and the edge between them
is removed in the first step of the rewiring process. The sec-
ond step of the rewiring process adds an edge between the
node v1 and v3, where v3 is constrained to be within 2-hops
away from v1. Some analysis in (Ma et al., 2019) shows
that the rewiring operation tends to keep the eigenvalues
of the graph’s Laplacian matrix, which makes it difficult to
detect the attacker.
6.7. Defending Graph Neural Networks
Many works have shown that graph neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, even though there is still
no consensus on how to define the unnoticeable perturbation.
Some defending works have already appeared. Many of
them are inspired by the popular defense methodology in
image classification, using adversarial training to protect
GNN models, (Feng et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019), which
provides moderate robustness.
7. Adversarial Examples in Audio and Text
Data
Adversarial examples also exist in DNNs’ applications in
audio and text domains. An adversary can craft fake speech
or fake sentences that mislead the machine language pro-
cessors. Meanwhile, deep learning models on audio/text
data have already been widely used in many tasks, such as
Apple Siri and Amazon Echo. Therefore, the studies on
adversarial examples in audio/text data domain also deserve
our attention.
As for text data, the discreteness nature of the inputs makes
the gradient-based attack on images not applicable anymore
and forces people to craft discrete perturbations on different
granularities of text (character-level, word-level, sentence-
level, etc.). In this section, we introduce the related works
in attacking NLP architectures for different tasks.
7.1. Speech Recognition Attacks
The work in (Carlini & Wagner, 2018) studies how to attack
state-of-art speech-to-text transcription networks, such as
DeepSpeech (Hannun et al., 2014). In their setting, when
given any speech waveform x, they can add an inaudible
sound perturbation δ that makes the synthesized speech x+δ
be recognized as any targeted desired phrase.
In their attacking work, they limited the maximum Decibels
(dB) on any time of the added perturbation noise, so that the
audio distortion is unnoticeable. Moreover, they inherit the
C & W’s attack method (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) on their
audio attack setting.
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7.2. Text Classification Attacks
Text classification is one of main tasks in natural language
processing. In text classification, the model is devised to
understand a sentence and correctly label the sentence. For
example, text classification models can be applied on the
IMDB dataset for characterizing user’s opinion (positive
or negative) on the movies, based on the provided reviews.
Recent works of adversarial attacks have demonstrated that
text classifiers are easily misguided by slightly modifying
the texts’ spelling, words or structures.
7.2.1. ATTACKING WORD EMBEDDING
The work (Miyato et al., 2016) considers to add perturbation
on the word embedding (Mikolov et al., 2013), so as to
fool a LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) classifier.
However, this attack only considers perturbing the word
embedding, instead of original input sentence.
7.2.2. ATTACKING WORDS AND LETTERS
The work HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) considers to re-
place a letter in a sentence in order to mislead a character-
level text classifier (each letter is encoded to a vector). For
example, as shown in Figure 11, changing a single letter in
a sentence alters the model’s prediction on its topic. The
attack algorithm manages to achieve this by finding the
most-influential letter replacement via gradient information.
These adversarial perturbations can be noticed by human
readers, but they don’t change the content of the text as a
whole, nor do they affect human judgments.
Figure 11. Replace one letter in a sentence to alter a text classifier’s
prediction on a sentence’s topic. (Image Credit: (Ebrahimi et al.,
2017))
The work in (Liang et al., 2017) considers to manipulate
the victim sentence on word and phrase levels. They try
adding, removing or modifying the words and phrases in
the sentences. In their approach, the first step is similar to
HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2017). For each training sample,
they find the most-influential letters, called “hot characters”.
Then, they label the words that have more than 3 “hot charac-
ters” as “hot words”. “Hot words” composite “hot phrases”,
which are most-influential phrases in the sentences. Ma-
nipulating these phrases is likely to influence the model’s
prediction, so these phrases composite a “vocabulary” to
guide the attacking. When given a sentence, an adversary
can use this vocabulary to find the weakness of the sentence,
add one hot phrase, remove a hot phrase in the given sen-
tence, or insert a meaningful fact which is composed of hot
phrases.
DeepWordBug (Gao et al., 2018) and TextBugger Li et al.
(2018a) are black-box attack methods for text classification.
The basic idea of the former is to define a scoring strategy
to identify the key tokens which will lead to a wrong predic-
tion of the classifier if modified. Then they try four types of
“imperceivable” modifications on such tokens: swap, substi-
tution, deletion and insertion, to mislead the classifier. The
latter follows the same idea, and improves it by introducing
new scoring functions.
The works (Samanta & Mehta, 2017; Iyyer et al., 2018) start
to craft adversarial sentences that grammatically correct and
maintain the syntax structure of the original sentence. The
work in (Samanta & Mehta, 2017) achieves this by using
synonyms to replace original words, or adding some words
which have different meanings in different contexts. On the
other hand, the work (Iyyer et al., 2018) manages to fool the
text classifier by paraphrasing the structure of sentences.
The work in (Lei et al., 2018) conducts sentence and word
paraphrasing on input texts to craft adversarial examples. In
this work, they first build a paraphrasing corpus that contains
a lot of word and sentence paraphrases. To find an optimal
paraphrase of an input text, a greedy method is adopted to
search valid paraphrases for each word or sentence from the
corpus. Moreover, they propose a gradient-guided method
to improve the efficiency of greedy search. This work also
has significant contributions in theory: they formally define
the task of discrete adversarial attack as an optimization
problem on a set functions and they prove that the greedy
algorithm ensures a 1 − 1e approximation factor for CNN
and RNN text classifiers.
7.3. Adversarial Examples in Other NLP Tasks
7.3.1. ATTACK ON READING COMPREHENSION
SYSTEMS
The work (Jia & Liang, 2017) studies whether Reading Com-
prehension models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In
reading comprehension tasks, the machine learning model
is asked to answer a given question, based on the model’s
“understanding” from a paragraph of an article. For example,
the work (Jia & Liang, 2017) concentrates on Stanford Ques-
tion Answering Dataset (SQuAD) where systems answer
questions about paragraphs from Wikipedia.
The authors successfully degrade the intelligence of the
state-of-art reading comprehension models on SQuAD by
inserting adversarial sentences. As shown in Figure 12, the
inserted sentence (blue) looks similar to the question, but
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it does not contradict the correct answer. This inserted sen-
tence is understandable for human readers but confuses the
machine a lot. As a result, the proposed attacking algorithm
reduced the performance of 16 state-of-art reading compre-
hension models from average 75% F1 score (accuracy) to
36%.
Figure 12. By adding an adversarial sentence which is similar to
the answer, the reading comprehension model gives a wrong an-
swer. (Image Credit: (Jia & Liang, 2017))
Their proposed algorithm AddSent shows a four-step opera-
tion to find adversarial sentences.
1. Fake Question: What is the name of the quarterback
whose jersey number is 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV?
2. Fake Answer: Jeff Dean
3. Question to Declarative Form: Quarterback Jeff Dean
is jersey number 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV.
4. Grammatically Correct: Quarterback Jeff Dean had
jersey number 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV.
7.3.2. ATTACK ON NEURAL MACHINE TRANSLATION
The work in (Belinkov & Bisk, 2017) studies the stability
of machine learning translation tools when their input sen-
tences are perturbed from natural errors (typos, misspellings,
etc.) and manually crafted distortions (letter replacement,
letter reorder). The experimental results show that the state-
of-arts translation models are vulnerable to both two types
of errors, and suggest adversarial training to improve the
model’s robustness.
Seq2Sick (Cheng et al., 2018) tries to attack seq2seq models
in neural machine translation and text summarization. In
their setting, two goals of attacking are set: to mislead the
model to generate an output which has on overlapping with
the ground truth, and to lead the model to produce an output
with targeted keywords. The model is treated as a white-box
and the attacking problem is formulated as an optimization
problem where they seek to solve a discrete perturbation by
minimizing a hinge-like loss function.
7.4. Dialogue Generation
Unlike the tasks above where success and failure are clearly
defined, in the task of dialogue, there is no unique appropri-
ate response for a given context. Thus, instead of misleading
a well-trained model to produce incorrect outputs, works
about attacking dialogue models seek to explore the prop-
erty of neural dialogue models to be interfered by the per-
turbations on the inputs, or lead a model to output targeted
responses.
The work in (Niu & Bansal, 2018) explores the over-
sensitivity and over-stability of neural dialogue models by
using some heuristic techniques to modify original inputs
and observe the corresponding outputs. They evaluate the
robustness of dialogue models by checking whether the
outputs change significantly with the modifications on the
inputs. They also investigate the effects that take place
when retraining the dialogue model using these adversarial
examples to improve the robustness and performance of the
underlying model.
In the work (He & Glass, 2018), the authors try to find
trigger inputs which can lead a neural dialogue model to
generate targeted egregious responses. They design a search-
based method to determine the word in the input that max-
imizes the generative probability of the targeted response.
Then, they treat the dialogue model as a white-box and
take advantage of the gradient information to narrow the
search space. Finally they show that this method works for
“normal” targeted responses which are decoding results for
some input sentences, but for manually written malicious
responses, it hardly succeeds.
The work (Liu et al., 2019) treats the neural dialogue model
as a black-box and adopts a reinforcement learning frame-
work to effectively find trigger inputs for targeted responses.
The black-box setting is stricter but more realistic, while
the requirements for the generated responses are properly
relaxed. The generated responses are expected to be se-
mantically identical to the targeted ones but not necessarily
exactly match with them.
8. Adversarial Examples in Miscellaneous
Tasks
In this section, we summarize some adversarial attacks in
other domains. Some of these domains are safety-critical,
so the studies on adversarial examples in these domains are
also important.
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8.1. Computer Vision Beyond Image Classification
1. Face Recognition
The work (Sharif et al., 2016) seeks to attack face
recognition models on both a digital level and physical
level. The main victim model is based on the architec-
ture in (Parkhi et al.), which is a 39-layer DNN model
for face recognition tasks. The attack on the digital
level is based on traditional attacks, like Szegedy’s
L-BFGS method (Section 3.1.2).
Beyond digital-level adversarial faces, they also suc-
ceed in misleading face recognition models on physical
level. They achieve this by asking subjects to wear their
3D printed sunglasses frames. The authors optimize
the color of these glasses by attacking the model on a
digital level: by considering various adversarial glasses
and the most effective adversarial glasses are used for
attack. As shown in Figure 13, an adversary wears the
adversarial glasses and successfully fool the detection
of victim face recognition system.
Figure 13. An adversary (left) wears a pair of adversarial glasses
and is recognized as a movie-star, Milla Jovovich. (Image Credit:
(Sharif et al., 2016))
2. Object Detection and Semantic Segmentation
There are also studies on semantic segmentation and
object detection models in computer vision (Xie et al.,
2017b; Metzen et al., 2017b). In both semantic segmen-
tation and object detection tasks, the goal is to learn a
model that associates an input image x with a series
of labels Y = {y1, y2, ...yN}. Semantic segmentation
models give each pixel of x a label yi, so that the im-
age is divided to different segments. Similarly, object
detection models label all proposals (regions where the
objects lie).
The work (Xie et al., 2017b) can generate an adversar-
ial perturbation on x which can cause the classifier to
give wrong prediction on all the output labels of the
model, in order to fool either semantic segmentation
or object detection models. The work (Metzen et al.,
2017b) finds that there exists universal perturbation for
any input image for semantic segmentation models.
8.2. Video Adversarial Examples
Most works concentrate on attacking static image classifi-
cation models. However, success on image attacks cannot
guarantee that there exist adversarial examples on videos
and video classification systems. The work (Li et al., 2018b)
uses GAN (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) to generate a dynamic
perturbation on video clips that can mislead the classifica-
tion of video classifiers.
8.3. Generative Models
The work (Kos et al., 2018) attacks the variational autoen-
coder (VAE) (Kingma & Welling, 2013) and VAE-GAN
(Larsen et al., 2015). Both VAE and VAE-GAN use an en-
coder to project the input image x into a lower-dimensional
latent representation z, and a decoder to reconstruct a new
image xˆ from z. The reconstructed image should maintain
the same semantics as the original image. In (Kos et al.,
2018)’s attack setting, they aim to slightly perturb the in-
put image x fed to encoder, which will cause the decoder
to generate image fdec(fenc(x)) having different meaning
from the input x. For example, in MNIST dataset, the input
image is ”1”, and the reconstructed image is ”0”.
8.4. Malware Detection
The existence of adversarial examples in safety-critical tasks,
such as malware detection, should be paid much attention.
The work (Grosse et al., 2016) built a DNN model on the
DREBIN dataset by (Arp et al., 2014), which contains
120,000 Android application samples, where over 5,000
are malware samples. The trained model has 97% accuracy,
but malware samples can evade the classifier if attackers add
fake features to them. Some other works (Hu & Tan, 2017;
Anderson et al., 2016) consider using GANs (Goodfellow
et al., 2014a) to generate adversarial malware.
8.5. Fingerprint Recognizer Attacks
Fingerprint recognition systems are also one of the most
safety-critical fields where machine learning models are
adopted. While, there are adversarial attacks undermining
the reliability of these models. For example, fingerprint
spoof attacks copy an authorized person’s fingerprint and
replicate it on some special materials such as liquid latex
or gelatin. Traditional fingerprint recognition techniques
especially minutiae-based models fail to distinguish the
fingerprint images generated from different materials. The
works (Chugh & Jain, 2018; Chugh et al., 2018) design a
modified CNN to effectively detect the fingerprint spoof
attack.
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Figure 14. Left figure: the brick takes correct actions to go up
to catch the ball. Right figure: the current state is perturbed by
changing one pixel. The policy gives an incorrect command to go
down. (Image Credit: (Huang et al., 2017))
8.6. Reinforcement Learning
Different from classification tasks, deep reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) aims to learn how to perform some human tasks,
such as play Atari 2600 games (Mnih et al., 2013) or play
Go (Silver et al., 2016b). For example, to play an Atari
game Pong, (Figure 14-left), the trained model takes input
from the latest images of game video (state - x), and outputs
a decision to move up or down (action - y). The learned
model can be viewed as a rule (policy - piθ) to win the game
(reward - L(θ, x, y)). A simple sketch can be: x piθ−→ y,
which is in parallel to classification tasks: x
f−→ y. The RL
algorithms are trained to learn the parameters of piθ.
The work (Huang et al., 2017) shows that deep reinforce-
ment learning models are also vulnerable to adversarial
examples. Their approach is inherited from FGSM (Good-
fellow et al., 2014b), to take one-step gradient on the state
x (latest images of game video) to craft a fake state x′. The
policy’s decision on x′ can be totally useless to achieve the
reward. Their results show that a slight perturbation on RL
models’ state, can cause large difference on the models’
decision and performance. Their work shows that Deep
Q Learning (Mnih et al., 2013), TRPO (Schulman et al.,
2015) and A3C (Mnih et al., 2016) are all vulnerable to their
attacks.
9. Conclusion
In this survey, we give a systemic, categorical and compre-
hensive overview on the recent works regarding adversarial
examples and their countermeasures, in multiple data do-
mains. We summarize the studies from each section in
the chronological order as shown in Appendix B, because
these works are released with relatively high frequency in
response to one another. The current state-of-the-art attacks
will likely be neutralized by new defenses, and these de-
fenses will subsequently be circumvented. We hope that
our work can shed some light on the main ideas of adversar-
ial learning and related applications in order to encourage
progress in the field.
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B. Dichotomy of Defenses
Defenses
Gradient Masking Robust Optimization Detection
Shattered Gradient
(Buckman et al., 2018)
(Guo et al., 2017)
Shattered Gradient
(Dhillon et al., 2018)
(Xie et al., 2017a)
Exploding/Vanishing Gra-
dient
(Song et al., 2017)
(Samangouei et al., 2018)
(Papernot et al., 2016b)
Auxilliary Model
(Grosse et al., 2016)
(Gong et al., 2017)
(Metzen et al., 2017a)
Statistical Methods
(Hendrycks & Gimpel,
2016)
(Grosse et al., 2017)
(Gretton et al., 2012)
Check Consistency
(Feinman et al., 2017)
(Xu et al., 2017)
Adversarial Training
(Goodfellow et al., 2014b)
(Madry et al., 2017)
(Trame`r et al., 2017)
(Sinha et al., 2017)
Certified Defense
(Wong & Kolter, 2017)
(Hein & Andriushchenko,
2017)
(Raghunathan et al.,
2018a)
(Sinha et al., 2017)
Regularization
(Cisse et al., 2017)
(Gu & Rigazio, 2014)
(Rifai et al., 2011)
